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TAXATION
CHARLES H. RANDALL, JR.*
Federal Estate Tax-Marital Deduction-Burden of
Estate Taxes
Suppose a client comes into a lawyer's office, asks that the
lawyer draw a will for him, and advises that he is worth
upwards of one-half a million dollars.1 The first thing that
the lawyer must do is to convince the client that a will is only
a part of what he needs; he needs an estate plan. This re-
quires a different orientation of thought by both lawyer and
client from the mere drawing of a will. First, it will cost the
lawyer more time and the client more money. Second, it will
require a much more candid and complete divulgence by the
client of all the circumstances of his affairs, business, family
and otherwise. Third, it is not something that the client or
the lawyer can put aside when completed; it must be peri-
odically reviewed by the client for changes in his economic
and family affairs, and by the lawyer for changes in the law,
especially the tax laws. Fourth, unless the lawyer can assure
himself that he is adequately experienced in the field of estate
planning, expert assistance will be required. The creation of
an estate plan must be a serious and careful undertaking.
Yet more serious is the devastation which can result to the
dispositive plans of a testator if the arts of the estate planner
are not utilized.
The goal of the estate planner is to achieve three inter-
acting aims: to carry out in the most effective manner possi-
ble the dispositive wishes of the client; to avoid unnecessary
litigation, either probate or tax; and to minimize taxes, where
compatible with the achievement of the other objectives. The
*Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. An estate plan might be necessary for an estate much smaller than
this, of course. For any estate exceeding sixty thousand dollars after
expenses, tax planning becomes significant. As the estate increases in
size, the need for careful tax planning increases, because the estate tax
rates are sharply progressive.
Another problem that should be of concern to the Bar is that of the
person who needs an estate plan but never consults a lawyer, and dies
intestate. An example is Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F. 2d 486 (4th Cir.
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first consideration is of course paramount. Tax planning is
always subordinate to the wishes of the testator. Neverthe-
less, tax planning has brought into being the specialty of
estate planning. Since the Revenue Act of 1932,2 which greatly
increased Federal estate tax rates, the need for careful tax
planning for substantial estates has become obvious. The law
schools have responded gradually to this need. Over the past
ten years, many law schools have introduced courses in Estate
Planning; the University of South Carolina has twice offered
such a course.8
One problem in estate planning is to provide which assets
of the estate will bear the burden of Federal estate taxes and
State inheritance and estate taxes. This is illustrated by
Gaither v. U. S. Trust Co. of New York 4 an action by the
executor, husband of the deceased testatrix, to construe the
will of Marie T. Gaither, which will was executed on May
23, 1949. Testatrix died on July 8, 1954. The will consisted
of five Items, which were in substance as follows: Item I
directed the executor to pay all debts, etc., "together with all
taxes, State and Federal, of whatever nature and kind" from
cash "or from the sale or exchange of any bonds, stocks or
debentures of which I may be seized and possessed if there is
not sufficient cash." Item II bequeathed to respondent trust
company "all stocks, bonds, debentures and other mixed prop-
erty now in its possession and now handled by them for me
under an Agency Agreement," in trust, income equally to
testatrix' husband and her daughter for their respective lives,
after which the income and then the corpus to be paid to the
grandchildren of the testatrix. Item III bequeathed certain
personal effects to the daughter. Item IV gave the residue to
the husband. Item V appointed the husband executor. The
estate was found to consist of securities valued at $635,795.62
held by the trust company under the Agency Agreement, and
disposed of by Item II of the will; securities held by the
testatrix, valued at $160,741.16; $6,303.75 in cash, real estate
valued at $11,300 and personalty valued at $2,113.25. Counsel
admitted in oral argument that debts, estate and inheritance
taxes would amount to approximately $250,000. Thus it can
be seen that if the burden of debts and taxes were to fall first
2. This imposed the so-called "Additional Estate Tax". Rates were
increased in 1934, 1935, 1940 and 1941. The estate tax is now found
in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2001-2207.
3. In Spring, 1954 and Summer, 1957.
4. 230 S. C. 568, 97 S. E. 2d 24 (1957).
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on the residue, the entire residue would be eliminated.
Counsel for the executor argued that under the terms set
forth in Item I, the executor was empowered absolutely to
determine which assets would be sold first to pay debts and
taxes, and in the alternative, that these burdens should be
borne ratably by the legatees of Items II and IV, in propor-
tion to the assets passing under those clauses. To buttress
the alternative argument, counsel pointed out that the assets
passing under Item IV were the only assets of the estate which
qualified for the Federal estate tax marital deduction, and
that if the residue of the estate were wiped out by these
charges, then no assets qualifying for the marital deduction
would be left in the estate. Hence counsel argued that the
so-called "doctrine of equitable apportionment ' r should be
applied. The Supreme Court found no intention in the lan-
guage of Item II to give the executor the power he claimed,
and held that absent such intention, the usual order for selec-
tion of assets to pay debts would govern. Thus the assets
covered by Item IV would have to be completely exhausted
first, before Item II assets could be applied.
Despite the zealous effort of counsel to maintain that the
intention of the testatrix was to permit the executor absolute
discretion to choose among assets from which to pay debts
and taxes, the decision of the Court seems compelled by the
South Carolina decisions. 7 The general rule is that, absent
an apportionment statutes or an expression of intention of
the testator to the contrary, the burden of estate taxes, like
other charges, falls on the residue or the general estate. 9
A common error in the drafting of wills is to fail to consider
the diminution or even elimination of the residue that can
result due to the impact of taxes and other charges on the
residue.' 0 Clearly the draftsman of the will in the instant
5. Pitts v. Hamrick, supra note 1; Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St.
475, 104 N. E. 2d 9 (1952).
6. The gist of appellant's argument is that Item I created a fund
from which taxes were to be paid. Counsel relied heavily on the word
"any" in Item I, as indicating that the Executor was authorized to select
the assets which would bear the taxes.
7. The Court cites Warley v. Warley, Bailey Eq. 397 (1831); Brown
v. James, 3 Strob. Eq. 24 (1849); Duncan v. Tobin, Dudley Eq. 161
(1838), as leading cases.
8. The pioneer statute providing for apportionment of Federal estate
taxes is the New York statute, N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAw § 124,
held constitutional in Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95 (1942).
9. Cases cited note 6 supra.
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case did not set forth precisely the intention of the testatrix
as to this problem.
The data disclosed in the Record on Appeal and the opinion
of the Court is not adequate to permit a more fundamental
criticism of the will, that is, to raise the question whether the
maximum marital deduction should have been taken in the
will. To deal with this question it would be necessary to know
just what was the testatrix' attitude towards her husband
and her daughter. Would she have wished to leave more prop-
erty to her husband in a form that qualified for the marital
deduction, if to do so would effect substantial over-all tax
savings in her estate? It would be necessary also to know
whether there was any substantial property not listed above
which would be includible in the testatrix' adjusted gross
estate for Federal estate tax purposes," and whether that
property itself qualified for the marital deduction. It would be
necessary to know the extent of the property held by the hus-
band in his own right. Lack of the complete picture forecloses
further discussion here. It can be pointed out, however, that
under the will as construed by the Court, no marital deduction
is allowable after the taxes are paid. The property in Item
II is clearly a terminable interest, 12 and hence does not qualify
for the marital deduction; the property in Item IV, which
does qualify, is extinguished by the payment of taxes. It is
also apparent 13 that even if the arguments of the Executor
had been accepted by the Court, the estate would be permitted
far less than the maximum marital deduction that could have
been obtained had the will been differently drafted.'4
Mr. Justice Oxner summarily disposed of counsel's argu-
ment that the doctrine of "equitable apportionment" should
be applied, and the taxes be paid ratably from the assets
passing under Items II and IV of the will.' 5 This doctrine,
the formulation of an estate plan is incomplete if the problem of paying
death taxes has not been worked out and the burden placed where, in the
best interests of all concerned, it should be placed." CASNER, ESTATE
PLANNING (CASES AND MATERIALS) 897, 898 (2d ed. 1956).
11. Under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035-2038, 2041, 2042.
12. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1).
13. The maximum allowable marital deduction is one-half of the ad-
justed gross estate. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (c).
14. It must be kept in mind when estimating possible tax savings that
property that qualifies for the marital deduction in the estate of a wife
will also pass through the husband's estate when he dies, and be taxed
in that estate, unless he has disposed of the property during his life. .
15. Justice Oxner said, "It was conceded in oral argument that this
question was not raised in the Court below. It is, therefore, not properly
[Vol. 10
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adopted by some courts,16 has permitted the apportionment
of Federal estate taxes where a tax saving would result there-
from. Perhaps these decisions are dubious at best; the only
equity discernible is the minimizing of the revenue going to
the general government. However, the principle should not
be applied to testate estates. As Respondent argued herein,
"... legislation is the appropriate means to accomplish this
purpose."'17 The rule that the residue must first bear charges
against the estate is a rule of property in South Carolina, and
there is no way of knowing that the testatrix did not rely
upon it in drawing her will. Especially is this true in a case
in which the Record is as sparse as in the instant case;
whether the marital deduction would be advantageous to the
testatrix even from the tax planning point of view requires
knowledge of the factors set out in the preceding paragraph
which the Record herein does not reveal. To ask the applica-
tion of the doctrine of "equitable apportionment" in a testate
case is to ask the Court to set up an estate plan after the death
of the testatrix.
Corporate Re-organization--Tax-Free Spin-Off
Beard v. South Carolina Tax Commission's involved the
highly technical question whether certain securities received
by shareholders pursuant to a reorganization constituted tax-
able income under the South Carolina Income Tax. Prior
to September 18, 1953, members of the Beard family owned,
in the proportions indicated below, all of the capital stock
of three South Carolina corporations. Beard's Oil Corporation
(capital $5,000, surplus $30,400) was owned 50% by H. E.
Beard, Sr. and 507 by Mary E. Beard; Beard Appliance Com-
pany (capital, $15,000, surplus, $24,500) was owned 50%
by H. E. Beard, Sr., and 50% by H. E. Beard, Jr.; and Cam-
den Petroleum Company (capital, $5,000, surplus, $10,225)
was owned 2% by H. E. Beard, Sr. and 98% by E. B. Beard.
On August 19, 1953, an "Agreement for Corporate Merger,
Consolidation and Reorganization" was entered between these
three corporations and the incorporators of a proposed new
before us. It may be added, however, that there is nothing in this will
to indicate an intent to provide a pro rata contribution and it is doubt-
ful in those states having apportionment statutes whether same would
be applicable under this will. See Baylor v. National Bank of Commerce
of Norfolk, supra, 194 Va. 1, 72 S. E. 2d 282."
16. Cases cited note 4 supra.
17. Brief of Respondent, p. 17.
18. 230 S. C. 357, 95 S. E. 2d 628 (1956).
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corporation, to be called Camden Equipment Company, Inc.
Under this Agreement the three pre-existing corporations
would be merged into a new corporation, Beard Oil Company,
the stock of the new corporation to be distributed to the share-
holders of the merged corporations in direct ratio to the
composite value of their respective shares in the three merging
corporations, valued according to an audit as of August 31,
1953. This Agreement provided that simultaneously with the
merger, and as an integral part thereof, all the depreciable
assets of the former corporations should be transferred "as a
'spin-off' " to Camden Equipment, and the shares of the latter
issued to stockholders of Beard Oil in the ratio of one share
of Camden for each share of Beard Oil held by each stock-
holder. This Agreement was duly carried out on August 19,
1953. Pursuant thereto, taxpayer E. B. Beard received 80
shares of Beard Oil and 4019 shares of Camden Equipment
stock.
The Tax Commission determined that the shares of Camden
Equipment constituted a distribution of a portion of the sur-
plus of Beard Oil Company, and that the receipt of it by E. B.
Beard constituted taxable income in the amount of $10,113.11,
for which the taxpayer was assessed taxes in the amount of
$448.07, together with interest. Taxpayer paid under protest
and sued to recover. The Tax Commission argued that the
reorganization must be viewed as consisting of two separate
steps: (1) the merger of Beard's Oil, Beard Appliance and
Camden Petroleum into Beard Oil; and (2) the transfer of
the depreciable assets of Beard Oil to Camden Equipment,
and the distribution of the shares of the latter to the tax-
payer and other stockholders. 20 The second step, in the opin-
ion of the Tax Commission, involved a distribution of taxable
income.
The Supreme Court held that whether viewed as one step
or as two, the transfer of shares of Camden Equipment to the
shareholders was an integral part of the reorganization and
was free from income tax, under CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
19. Camden Equipment was capitalized at $100 Par Value per share,
instead of $50 as had been originally contemplated; hence each share-
holder received one share of Camden Equipment for each two shares held
of Beard Oil.
20. The Tax Commission argued that South Carolina corporate law
did not authorize the merger of three corporations into two, and that
hence the transaction could only have been carried out in two steps.
[Vol. I0
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 19
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss1/19
19571 SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
CARO LINA, 1952 §§ 65-251 and 65-275.21 Writing for the Court,
Mr. Justice Legge said :22
Our search is for substance, not form,-for the realities
of the transaction, and not book entries. And from the
record here the conclusion is inescapable that the actual
result of the "reorganization, consolidation and merger"
was that each holder of stock of any of the three merging
corporations (which stock in each case included an inter-
est in a substantial earned surplus) received in exchange
therefor stock of Beard Oil Company and of Camden
Equipment Company, Inc., in proportion to and equal in
value to his holdings in the composite valuation of the
merging corporations....
This conclusion does not conflict with Wilson v. South
Carolina Tax Commission, 220 S. C. 171, 66 S. E. 2d 698.
In that case there was in reality no reorganization; a
corporation, in order to insulate its real estate (which
was earned surplus) from liability, had conveyed it to a
newly formed corporation, the stock of which was dis-
tributed among the stockholders of the old corporation.
The corporate existence and functions of the old corpora-
tion were not impaired, and its stockholders had given
nothing in exchange for the stock of the new corporation,
which was accordingly held taxable as dividends.2 3
21. These sections provide as follows:
65-251. Gross income defined.
The words 'gross income' mean the income of a taxpayer derived
from salaries, wages or compensation for personal service, of what-
ever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions, voca-
tions, trades, business, commerce, sales or dealings in property,
whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or
interest in such property, and also from interest, rent, dividends,
securities or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or
profit and income derived from any source whatsoever. The
amount of all such items shall be included in the gross income of
the income year in which received by the taxpayer unless, under the
methods of accounting permitted under this chapter, any such
amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a different period.
10-275. No gain or loss on corporate reorganizations generally.
In a reorganization, consolidation or merger the exchange of
stock or property for stock of a corporation a party to the re-
organization, consolidation or merger shall not be deemed to result
in gain or loss.
22. 230 S. C. at 370, 95 S. E. 2d at 635.
23. Under Federal tax law, this reorganization, occurring in 1953,
would be governed by INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 112 (b) (11) and 113
(a) (23), added by 65 Stat. 317 (1951). These sections permitted "spin-
offs" without recognition of gain or loss, unless it appeared that (1) any
corporation a party to the reorganization was not intended to continue
the active conduct of a business, or (2) the corporation whose stock was
distributed was being used as a device for the distribution of earnings.
7
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Compensatory Use Taa--Contract to Reimburse Vendee
The South Carolina Code24 imposes a 3% sales tax on retail
sales within the State. The Code25 also provides for a com-
pensatory use tax on the storage, use or other consumption
in the State of personal property purchased at retail; how-
ever, the user is relieved of liability for the use tax on prop-
erty upon which a sales tax has been paid. Thus the use tax
is a device for indirectly taxing sales to persons within the
State by out-of-State vendors, so that sellers within the State
will not be subject to competitive disadvantage as against in-
terstate sellers.20
In MeJunkin Corp. v. City of Orangeburg,27 Mcjunkin, a
West Virginia corporation, contracted to supply the City with
pipe for a municipal water system. In making payment to
McJunkin, the City deducted 3%o of the contract price, which
the City paid to the State of South Carolina for the use tax
on the pipe. Mcjunkin sued in the Federal District Court,
E. D. S. C., to recover this amount. The City claimed that
withholding this amount was proper because the contract in-
corporated certain specifications which the City had prepared
and issued in inviting bids, including the following specifica-
tion :28
All Federal, State and local taxes due or payable during
the time of contract on materials, equipment, or labor in
connection with this work must be included in the amount
bid by the Contractor and shall be paid to proper authori-
ties before acceptance.
Other provisions of the contract also referred to taxes. The
Court held, in an opinion by Judge Sobeloff affirming a
decision by Judge Wyche, that under the contract the vendor
was required to include the use tax in his bid, and the deduc-
tion of this amount by the City was proper.29 One strong
Hence the Federal statutory treatment of the situation is much more
detailed than is found in the South Carolina provisions. See note 19
supra. Neither briefs of counsel nor the opinion refer to the Federal
analogy.
24. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 65-1401.
25. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 65-1421, 1422, 1425.
26. The constitutionality of such statutes under the Commerce Clause
of the Federal Constitution was upheld in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,
300 U. S. 577 (1937). See also General Trading Co. v. Tax Commission,
322 U. S. 335 (1944) and cases cited therein.
27. 238 F. 2d 528 (4th Cir. 1956).
28. 238 F. 2d at 530.
29. Since this is primarily a question of construing the relevant docu-
ments under the law of contracts, it is not treated at length here.
[Vol. 10
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reason suggested by the Court which compels this construction
of the contract is that the City in issuing invitations to bid
obviously wished to place interstate and intra-state bidders
on the same competitive basis, so that the City could judge
which bid was lowest.
30
McJunkin argued that as an out-of-State vendor not doing
business within the State it could not be subjected to South
Carolina use taxes.31 The Court held that this issue was not
raised by the record. The vendor is bound by the contract
to reimburse the City for the amount paid as use taxes. Hence
no question is raised of the State attempting to collect the
taxes from McJunkin; the sole controversy relates to the
terms of the contract.
Execution for Delinquent Taxes-De Facto Officeholder
McCutchen v. Hinnant31l was an action to recover possession
of an unimproved lot of land which had been sold under exe-
cution for delinquent county property taxes. The tax collector
had employed an assistant, an office not authorized by stat-
ute,32 and the assistant had levied on the lot, pursuant to
which the sale was made. The Court held that the sale was
ineffectual to convey title, and that it could not be upheld by
the doctrine of de facto acts. In order to have a de facto of-
ficeholder, the Court holds, there must be an office duly auth-
orized by statute which the officer claims to hold.33
Standing to Sue for Taxes of Another Taxpayer
In Watson v. City of Orangeburg3 4 plaintiff, a property
owner and taxpayer of the City, sued 24 other property own-
ers, joining the City and certain of its officials. The action
was brought to recover from the property-owner defendants
for the City certain taxes, with interest and penalties, which
plaintiff alleged these defendants owed the City. The plain-
tiff claimed that these defendants were being exempted from
taxes by virtue of certain ordinances which he alleged were
unconstitutional and therefore void. The Court held that the
30. 238 F. 2d at 531, 532.
31. Citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U. S. 340 (1954).
31a. 229 S. C. 448, 93 S. E. 2d 462 (1956).
32. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 65-2601-2609 provides
that delinquent taxes are collected by "one discreet person to be known
as tax collector."
33. The Court distinguished Commercial Bank of Augusta v. Sandford,
103 F. 98 (C. C., D. S. C., 1900).
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plaintiff could not maintain the action. Unless a statute
provides otherwise, only the taxing sovereign can sue to collect
taxes due it. The Court left open the question whether man-
damus would lie to compel the City officials to proceed against
the exempted property owners.
Irregular Tax Sale--Laches
Houtson v. International Paper Company35 involved a con-
demnation proceeding instituted in 1952. Plaintiffs filed
therein a claim to part of the compensation, alleging that they
had owned the property in 1934 and that it had been sold at a
tax sale in that year. The sale was allegedly irregular in that
the property had been listed in the tax sale proceedings in
the name of the deceased prior owner rather than in the
names of his heirs, the plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit affirmed
decision of Judge Timmerman that the plaintiffs' claim was
barred by laches.
Legislation
A few statutes worthy of mention under this topic of the
survey were enacted during the past year. One deals with
the valuation of certain leaseholds for tax purposes, and the
important language therein provides as follows :6
SECTION 1. Certain conveyed leasehold estates to be
valued for tax purposes as real estate.--When any lease-
hold estate is conveyed for a definite term by any grantor
whose property is exempt from taxation to a grantee
whose property is not exempt, the leasehold estate shall
be valued for property tax purposes as real estate.
Two others deal with tax liens on personal property. The
first, enacted June 20, 1957, provides :37
SECTION 1. The liens effected for the South Carolina
Tax Commission, pursuant to authority vested in the
Commission, shall attach to and become a lien upon the
title to and interest in personal property or chattels de-
fined as personal property of the taxpayer against whom
it is issued. The lien shall attach when duly filed and
recorded in the office of the clerk of the county in which
the taxpayer resides or possesses such property. No such
lien shall operate so as to prevent a merchant from sell-
36. 233 F. 2d 69 (4th Cir. 1956).
36. Act No. 79 of Acts and Joint Resolutions, Adv. Sheet No. 2, 89.
37. Act. No. 404 of Acts and Joint Resolutions, R603, § 674.
[Vol. 10
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 19
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol10/iss1/19
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
ing items from his stock of goods in trade for a fair con-
sideration in the normal and ordinary course of business
until and unless a levy shall have been made thereupon.
As used herein, the word 'merchant' includes a retailer,
a wholesaler, or a jobber.
The other statute, signed into law two days earlier, on July 18,
1957, provides :38
SECTION 1. The lien for unpaid taxes on personal prop-
erty shall also attach to any personal property subse-
quently acquired by the delinquent taxpayer.
The other sections of these statutes provide for repeal of in-
consistent statutes, and for the effective date of the Acts,
in each case, the date of signing by the Governor.
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